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Abstract 
 
We have argued elsewhere that retrospective voting is often causally unsophisticated, ideologically 
confused, and highly myopic (Achen and Bartels 2002; 2004).  Here, we extend those assertions to 
party realignments, arguing that they, too, depend far less on ideological shifts than on the simple 
cumulation of myopic retrospections in election years.   We examine voters’ responses to the most far-
reaching economic disaster in the history of democratic politics, the Great Depression.  In contrast to 
Key (1958) and others who have interpreted the New Deal realignment in the U.S. as “a popular 
ratification of the broad features of new public policy,” we show that Democratic gains in the 1930s 
were based primarily on short-term income gains and losses, which cumulated willy-nilly into a 
durable Democratic majority in the electorate.  This interpretation is bolstered by comparison with 
other democracies in which voters produced equally significant and durable partisan realignments—
and equally successful economic recoveries—by punishing whoever was in office at the time--liberal 
incumbents (Britain, Australia), conservative and then liberal incumbents (Sweden), liberal and then 
conservative incumbents (Canada), anti-nationalist incumbents (Ireland), or coalitions including many 
or all of the mainstream parties (Weimar Germany).  We also document the role of economic 
discontent in the Irish realignment, which previous scholars have interpreted as a triumph of nationalist 
ideology.  Finally, we describe the rise of the Social Credit Party in the Canadian province of Alberta, 
which dramatizes the vulnerability of democratic electorates to demagogues and ideological extremists 
in times of economic distress. 
 
 
Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, April 7-9, 2005.  Copyright by the authors.   1 
Partisan Hearts and Gall Bladders 
Retrospection and Realignment in the Wake of the Great Depression
1
 
 
 
 
Americans are accustomed to thinking of the New Deal realignment as a triumph of both 
democratic responsiveness and Democratic ideology.  In the face of an unprecedented economic 
catastrophe, a rigidly conservative government resisted public pressure to provide energetic relief and 
institutional reforms.  Voters responded with a historic repudiation of the incumbent president, Herbert 
Hoover, in 1932.  Franklin Roosevelt swept into office with 57 percent of the popular vote, and the 
Democrats—a minority party for most of the preceding 70 years— won 313 of the 435 seats in the 
House of Representatives. 
Roosevelt’s first hundred days in the White House brought a flurry of innovative policies.  A 
robust economic recovery followed in short order.  Real per capita income increased by one-third 
between 1933 and 1936 and unemployment declined by one-third.  Voters rewarded Roosevelt with a 
landslide reelection in 1936; he won more than 60 percent of the popular vote and carried 46 of 48 
states.  He went on to win an unprecedented four terms in the White House, and the Democratic Party 
enjoyed a durable reservoir of popular support that allowed it to dominate congressional elections for 
most of the next 60 years.  As V. O. Key, Jr. (1958, 589) summarized these events, “The election of 
1936 ratified a sharp turn in public policy and successive Democratic victories clinched the reforms of 
the New Deal.” 
Our aim in this paper is to challenge this conventional interpretation of the New Deal era.  We do 
                                            
1  The work reported here was facilitated by research support to both authors from Princeton University, and by 
a grant to Bartels from the Carnegie Corporation’s Carnegie Scholars program. We are grateful to both 
institutions for their generous assistance to us.  Richard Sinnott gave us his time generously as an invaluable 
source of information and expertise regarding the political history of Ireland.  Cormac O Grada also helped us 
with several complicated issues in Irish economic history.  Archivists in Alberta and Saskatchewan answered 
numerous queries and requests for data with patience and efficiency.  James Snyder kindly shared his U.S. 
congressional election data.  Seminar participants at the University of North Carolina provided stimulating   2 
so in part by analyzing American voters’ reactions to the Depression, using aggregate electoral and 
economic data to document the importance of myopic economic retrospections in accounting for the 
Democratic Party’s success in presidential and congressional elections throughout the 1930s.  We 
bolster our interpretation of the New Deal realignment by juxtaposing the American experience with 
parallel developments in several other democracies.  We note the impressive consistency with which 
electorates around the world deposed incumbent governments during the worst days of the Depression, 
regardless of their ideologies.  We also note the impressive consistency with which new incumbents 
presided over robust economic recoveries and were rewarded with long runs in office—again, 
regardless of their ideologies.  Thus, what looks to the American eye like a triumph of both democratic 
responsiveness and Democratic ideology may instead be an illusion produced by a specific 
configuration of election dates, partisan alterations, and economic vicissitudes in a world where 
policies are, in fact, largely irrelevant and voters are blindly and myopically retrospective. 
 
The New Deal Realignment 
For their part, academics have tended to dismiss campaign slogans of the past like ‘the full 
dinner pail’ and ‘a chicken in every pot’ on the grounds that something deeper must have 
been going on in these elections.  But perhaps it wasn’t. 
            – David R. Mayhew (2002, 161) 
  
The conventional account of FDR’s triumph in 1932 is that it represented a protest vote, a cry for 
help, with the electorate taking a chance on a largely unknown and cautious moderate whose principal 
recommendation was that he was not Herbert Hoover.  As Key (1947, 268) put it, 
 
The campaign gave to the public no clear-cut alternatives of policy, except with respect to 
prohibition.  The Democrats were thoroughly wet.  But no other issue of a major nature 
presented itself sharply and dramatically in the campaign.  The times called for a great 
debate on measures to lift the American economy out of the morass, but a stranger might 
                                                                                                                                                     
reactions to a preliminary version of the argument, and many colleagues, students, and friends exposed to our 
previous work on democratic accountability have provided helpful encouragement and criticism.     3 
have presumed that all the fighting was about when and whether one could get a glass of 
legal beer.  . . . [I]t is doubtful that the rational appeals of either candidate had much to do 
with the election results.  All types and classes of people had suffered deprivations; all of 
them were anxious for a change.  Poor men, rich men, middle-class men, farmers, workers, 
all moved over into the Democratic ranks in sufficient number to give Roosevelt a 
resounding victory.  All these classes could identify themselves with the ‘forgotten man,’ 
and they could equally feel themselves deserving of a ‘new deal’ without necessarily 
insisting on exactitude in the definition of what the ‘new deal’ was to be.
2
 
 
By 1936, however, the character of Roosevelt’s administration had become much clearer, not 
least to himself, and he campaigned well to the left of where he had stood in 1932.  In his famous 
speech at Madison Square Garden two nights before the election, he attacked “organized money” for 
their hatred of him, and proclaimed to a thunderous ovation, “I welcome their hatred.”  A new political 
barometer, the Gallup poll, found a striking degree of partisan polarization in the general public: 45% 
of the poll respondents, and 83% of Republicans, agreed that “the acts and policies of the Roosevelt 
Administration may lead to dictatorship” (Key 1961, 246).   
Despite the breadth and intensity of opposition to Roosevelt, the election result was a historic 
landslide for the incumbent.  The voters joining in that landslide are said to have been “attracted by the  
Democratic program and the Rooseveltian personality and leadership” (Sundquist 1983, 214).  Even 
the authors of The American Voter, no friends to intellectualist interpretations of elections, used 
virtually identical language, writing that “The program of welfare legislation of the New Deal and the 
extraordinary personality of its major exponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, brought about a profound 
realignment of party strength, which has endured in large part up to the present time” (Campbell et al. 
1960, 534). 
Key, who had disparaged the importance of policy issues in the 1932 election, interpreted the 
                                            
2  Lest Key’s emphasis on the political significance of repealing Prohibition strike modern readers as 
exaggerated, we note that a highly laudatory account of Roosevelt’s campaign published in the early months of 
the new administration (Guilfoyle 1933, 218-219) suggested that the “return of beer in less than a month after 
the new Administration took office did more than anything else to inspire the people with confidence in the 
President. . . . Seldom, if ever before in the history of the country, has there been such a major accomplishment   4 
1936 election in a very different light.  “The return of a party to power under circumstances [like 
those] of the 1936 campaign,” he wrote (Key 1958, 578-579),
3
 
 
gives such an election a special significance.  Drastic innovations in public policy aroused 
the most bitter denunciation by the outs; the ins had to stand on their record.  The electorate 
had before it the question whether to ratify these innovations, few of which had been 
clearly foreshadowed in the 1932 campaign.  The result could only be interpreted as a 
popular ratification of the broad features of new public policy. 
 
This interpretation of the 1936 election has persisted down to the present, making it a textbook 
example of a policy-based realigning election.  For example, Hershey (2005, 294) wrote that 
  
At critical times in American history, the parties have divided in ways that were, if not 
truly ideological, at least determinedly policy oriented.  In the 1936 presidential election, 
for example, the Democrats and the Republicans offered dramatically different solutions to 
a nation devastated by the Great Depression.  The hardships of that economic collapse 
probably focused voter attention to an unusual degree on the possible remedies that 
government could provide.  This, combined with a campaign centered on the pros and cons 
of the Roosevelt program for social and economic change, may well have produced 
something close to a mandate in the election for both the president and Congress.  
 
Similarly, in a book-length study of party identification, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002, 
106-107) emphasized the importance of enduring social identities in the development and maintenance 
of partisan attachments but cited the New Deal as a salient exception: 
 
Although we are in general skeptical of ideology-based explanations of party identification, 
the New Deal represents an instance in which such explanations work.  Here was an 
unusually clear ideological divide between the parties, dramatized again and again as the 
Republicans denounced relief programs enacted by the Democratic executive and 
legislature.  In the formative moment when the new party system emerged, and issues such 
as the scope of government replaced the tariff, it is quite possible that ideological affinity 
shaped party attachments to an unusual extent. 
 
The left panel of Figure 1 charts the course of the Great Depression in the U.S. as measured by 
                                                                                                                                                     
in such a short time. . . . If there was any turning point in the attitude of the people toward this depression it 
came simultaneously with beer.”   5 
changes from year to year in real personal income per capita.
4  The right panel charts electoral support 
for the incumbent president’s party (Republicans from 1928 through 1932, Democrats from 1932 
through 1940) in presidential and congressional elections.
5
 
  
***  Figure 1  *** 
 
  It should be evident that there is a good deal of correspondence between the economic and 
electoral patterns in Figure 1.  In 1930, the first year of widespread economic distress, the Republican 
Party lost 3.6% of the two-party House vote (and 52 seats, plus 8 in the Senate) in a midterm election.  
Two more years of accelerating depression triggered a thoroughgoing repudiation of Hoover and the 
Republicans in 1932.  Roosevelt and the Democrats took power in early 1933, at what turned out to be 
almost precisely the low point of the Depression.  Three years of steady improvement saw real 
incomes return almost to their 1929 level in 1936; the Democrats made modest gains in the midterm 
election of 1934 and again in the presidential and congressional elections of 1936, adding a total of 
2.6% and 3.2%, respectively, to their 1932 shares of the two-party House and presidential votes.  The 
economy continued to improve in 1937 but took a marked turn for the worse in 1938, with incomes 
falling below their 1936 level and unemployment rising back to 19 percent; the Democrats lost 7.3% of 
the two-party House vote (and 73 seats, plus 6 in the Senate), leaving them well behind where they had 
been in 1932.  In 1939 and 1940 the recovery resumed, and the Democrats regained some of their lost 
ground, but they were still less popular than they had been in 1932—and less popular than the 
                                                                                                                                                     
3  The interpolated words are from a subsequent (1958) edition of Key’s textbook, which repeats the quoted 
passage with only minor alteration. 
4  Data on real per capita personal income are from Table 7.1 of the National Income and Product Accounts 
available from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb).  Unemployment figures tell much the same story as the real income 
figures, except that unemployment remained well above its pre-Depression level throughout the 1930s.  
According to the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (Statistical Office of the United Nations 1949), the 
unemployment rate increased from 3.2% in 1929 to 23.6% in 1932, peaked at 24.9% in 1933, declined to 14.3% 
in 1937 before spiking at 19.0% in 1938, then declined back to 14.6% by 1940.   6 
Republicans had been in 1928.  
The conventional, ideological interpretation of the voting patterns in the right panel of Figure 1 is 
that voters punished Hoover for his conservative ideological orthodoxy in 1930 and 1932, rewarded 
Roosevelt for adopting more appropriate, progressive policies in the early years of the New Deal, and 
tapped the ideological brakes in 1938 when Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme and the “second New 
Deal” raised concerns that policy might be drifting too far to the left.
6
Although this period predates the survey-based measure of “Policy Mood” developed by Stimson 
(1991), it is not hard to imagine shifts in public opinion that were smoothly responsive to the policies 
adopted in Washington, and that led in turn to both the electoral shifts evident in Figure 1 and short-
term policy adjustments by the Democrats during the course of the New Deal.  This is the logic of 
“dynamic representation” outlined by Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson in The Macro Polity (2002), 
which seems to provide a general theoretical framework quite consistent with the historical accounts of 
Key, Sundquist, and other analysts of the New Deal realignment. 
   (“By 1940,” it is said—
somewhat arbitrarily—“the New Deal had run its course” (Key 1958, 209).) 
Our alternative interpretation is that the correspondence between income changes and electoral 
shifts in Figure 1 can be accounted for in the simpler terms suggested by Mayhew (2002, 161): when 
voters got a chicken in every pot at election time they liked the incumbent party’s ideology just fine, 
whatever it happened to be; but when incomes eroded and unemployment escalated they became ripe 
for defection to anyone who would promise to make things better.   
The authors of The Macro Polity allowed in principle for the possibility that “open-minded 
voters” might “say yes to whatever works,” so that “the degree of prosperity and well-being influences 
ideological choices by ordinary voters, depending on who is in power and how the country is going” 
                                                                                                                                                     
5  The popular vote shares shown in the right panel of Figure 1 are taken from Rusk (2001), as are the vote and 
seat shifts reported in the text.   7 
(Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 440).  However, they reported finding “little in the way of 
convincing statistical support” for this sort of interaction between economic conditions and liberal or 
conservative policy moods in the post-war period (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 441).  
Our own analysis of economic voting in the post-war period (Achen and Bartels 2004) suggests 
that economic conditions have a substantial direct effect on election outcomes—but only economic 
conditions at the time of the election.  Of course, one might expect that the Depression would be 
different.  The depth of the crisis may have focused voters’ minds.  Lost jobs and lost homes, hungry 
children and ruined lives should not have been forgotten quickly.  By the same token, the continuing 
intense debate in the country over Roosevelt and his program might have allowed voters to see the 
connection between their circumstances and political decisions in Washington, making them more 
ideological than usual as well as less myopic than usual.     
The elections of the Depression era were conducted in dramatic economic circumstances, with 
states undergoing very large gains and losses in real income over the period.  In 1936, for example, 
real personal income per capita increased by 19% in Colorado, 20% in Delaware, and 24% in Nevada.  
At the same time, real income plunged by 16% in North Dakota and by 25% in South Dakota.
7
Table 1 reports the results of a series of regression analyses exploring the bases of Roosevelt’s 
  
Figures for some of the other Depression years are even more variable.  Thus there is no statistical 
difficulty in assessing the impact of state-level economic conditions on the vote.  That is why this 
period provides such fertile ground for statistical analysis of retrospective voting. 
                                                                                                                                                     
6  For example, Sundquist (1983, 226) supposed that “independent voters were by now rebelling against 
Democratic excesses and swinging to a Republican party that in many states had acquired new progressive 
leadership, and deviant Republicans, having chastised their party sufficiently, were returning home.” 
7  All of our state-level data on real per capita income are from “State Personal Income 1929-2000,” a CD-ROM 
issued by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, November, 2001.  
We converted the published figures to 1929 dollars using the ratio of current to constant dollars in the BEA’s 
Disposable Personal Income series in Table 7.1 of the National Income and Product Accounts 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb).  We define real income change in each year as the difference in 
logged real income levels.  Taking natural logs converts gains and losses to an equivalent scale, so that they 
count equally (and are more likely to satisfy the usual assumptions underlying regression analysis.)  To a good   8 
1936 landslide.  We confine our analysis to states that were not part of the Confederacy, since the Solid 
South of this era, with its heavy Democratic leanings, low white turnout, excluded African-American 
population, and racially based politics, offers little opportunity to assess the effect of economic 
conditions on voting behavior.  To avoid giving undue influence to sparsely populated states, we 
weight each observation in the regression analyses by total turnout in the 1936 election. 
 
***  Table 1  *** 
 
Our goal is to assess the effect of economic conditions during the Roosevelt administration on the 
vote.  Doing so is not an anachronism, imposing current ideas on people of a different era.  To the 
contrary, political insiders in 1936 were well aware of the connection between voters’ income and their 
choices at the polls.  Indeed, during the campaign James Farley and Harry Hopkins, FDR’s powerful 
aides, were repeatedly accused of trying to buy the election with relief funds (Sherwood 1948, 85).
8
                                                                                                                                                     
approximation when changes are not large, the differences in the logs represent fractional changes.  We multiply 
them by 100 to express them as percentage changes. 
  
The pattern of per capita government transfer funds in each year from 1933 to 1936 is not inconsistent 
8  We tried to assess the direct electoral effect of transfer payments and “relief” during this period.  Both are 
included in personal income, and thus are already counted in our calculations, but we sought to examine them 
separately because they are more directly under government control.  However, it proved impossible to do so.  
In the early New Deal years transfer payments went primarily to the states with large cities, where the greatest 
need was concentrated; but those were areas were FDR may have done especially well for other reasons.  Not 
until 1936 were the problems of the drought-stricken lower Midwest fully recognized.  Payments to those states 
jumped dramatically from 1935 to 1936 (they tripled in Oklahoma, for example), but it was too little and too 
late—those states backed off from Roosevelt in the election.  Thus, 1936 transfers turn out to have no apparent 
effect on Roosevelt’s vote gains.  Relief money, too, proved impossible to study.  Payments per person within 
each state were quite steady from month to month, with only a small upward drift until late 1935.  The rules 
seem to have been bureaucratic rather than political.  Then at that point, the New Deal turned the problem over 
to the states, with only partial federal subsidies thereafter.  The result is that per-person relief payments dropped 
dramatically in many states during the election year, and the number of people on relief dropped in most states 
due to improving economic conditions (Whiting 1942).  Less money was spent, and that was partly a bad thing 
(state penny-pinching) and partly a good thing (fewer people were needy).  None of the drop was the fault of the 
federal government in any case, at least not directly, and the payment differences across states appear to reflect 
differences in state capacity and enthusiasm.  Thus any test of the federal effect of relief is of doubtful validity, 
particularly since the amount of money involved is small relative to total transfers, and greatly smaller than 
changes in personal income.   9 
with that suspicion, showing an unmistakable upward jump in 1936.
9
In our account, voters’ reactions to Roosevelt’s first term rested primarily on simple short-term 
retrospection.  In order to test that assertion, we focus on real per capita income growth in each state in 
the election year, 1936.  Figure 2 summarizes the relationship across the 37 non-southern states 
between these election-year income changes and Roosevelt’s popular vote gain in 1936 by comparison 
with 1932.  As an aid in interpreting the scatterplot of state income changes and vote shifts, the figure 
includes a regression line representing the turnout-weighted bivariate relationship.  It is clear that there 
is a strong and fairly consistent tendency for Roosevelt to gain support in states that experienced 
significant income growth in 1936, and to lose support in states that experienced declines in real 
income.  On its face, this evidence is quite consistent with our myopic, non-ideological interpretation 
of the election outcome. 
  
 
***  Figure 2  *** 
 
Our interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the most prominent residuals in Figure 2 seem very 
hard to attribute to states’ differing ideological tastes for activist policies along the lines pursued by 
Roosevelt during his first term.  Oklahoma, the state with the largest negative residual, was the heart of 
the Dustbowl in this period, and New Deal policies were often misdirected and mismanaged there 
(Bryant 1975); thus, one need not appeal to conservative ideology to explain why support for FDR 
dropped more in 1936 than the raw economic figures would seem to justify.  Roosevelt also did less 
well than economic conditions seemed to warrant in Nebraska and Nevada—but noticeably better than 
the overall relationship would lead one to expect in Montana, Utah, and the Dakotas.  In the case of 
Montana the discrepancy may reflect the fact that real per capita income increased by more than 40% 
in 1934 and 1935 after Roosevelt officially supported the price of silver in 1934, a victory in a battle 
                                            
9  However, no such pattern appears in the corresponding data from 1937-1940.  The recovery was much farther 
along by then, and payments may have settled into bureaucratic routine.   10 
dating to the nineteenth century; for that reason or some other, Montana’s support for FDR was almost 
ten percentage points higher in 1936 than it had been in 1932, despite the fact that real income declined 
slightly in the election year.
10
The regression analyses reported in Table 1 elaborate in a variety of ways upon the basic 
relationship evident in Figure 2 between election-year income changes and vote shifts.  For example, 
three of the six regression models (1, 2, and 5) include measures of state income growth in 1935, 1934, 
and 1933 in addition to the 1936 income figures.  In every case, whereas election-year income growth 
has a strong positive effect on Roosevelt’s vote, previous income growth has little or no effect.  Thus, 
the evidence from the 1930s is quite consistent with evidence from more recent presidential elections 
in suggesting that voters’ retrospective assessments of the economy are quite myopic (Achen and 
Bartels 2004). 
  Another state in which Roosevelt gained more in 1936 than its 
economic conditions would seem to imply was Pennsylvania, almost surely because the Republican 
Philadelphia machine, which held down the Democratic vote in 1932, was no longer able to do so from 
1936 on. 
The second and subsequent columns of Table 1 include the percentage change in turnout between 
1932 and 1936 as an additional explanatory variable.
11
                                            
10  Another possibility is that in a state so dependent on mineral extraction and lumbering, Montanans’ 
retrospections were focused differently.  Of course, it is also possible that the apparent mismatch between 
income changes and electoral responses simply reflects measurement error in income changes in a small state 
with many isolated ranchers. 
  The parameter estimates show that Roosevelt 
gained more support in states with large numbers of new voters in 1936 than in states where turnout 
was relatively static.  For example, comparing a state with a 5-point turnout gain between 1932 and 
1936 and one with a 20-point turnout gain, Roosevelt’s expected vote in the latter would be about 1.7 
percentage points higher.  These estimates imply that Roosevelt’s vote share in 1936 was 10 to 15 
percentage points higher among new voters than among old voters (who were themselves giving   11 
Roosevelt almost 60 percent support).  Thus, our analysis is quite consistent with the notion that “The 
rising strength of the Democratic Party during the Roosevelt years probably depended heavily on new 
voters drawn to the polls by the Great Depression and the New Deal” (Campbell et al 1960, 89).
12
The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of Table 1 include state-level measures of a variety of 
economic and demographic characteristics that loom large in historical accounts of the New Deal 
realignment: real per capita income, the rural farm proportion of the population, the percentage of 
foreign born whites, and the percentage of blacks.
 
13  To the extent that poor people, farmers, 
immigrants, and blacks responded more enthusiastically than other citizens to the New Deal policies 
implemented between 1933 and 1936, we should expect to see that states in which they were more 
numerous were relatively more supportive of Roosevelt in 1936 than they had been in 1932.  In every 
instance, the reverse seems to be true.  None of the effects is very large or very precisely estimated; but 
insofar as there are any patterns at all, they suggest that Roosevelt gained less support among all these 
groups than in other parts of the population.
14
Regardless of exactly how we specify the regression models in Table 1, the data provide strong, 
consistent evidence that Roosevelt’s reelection hinged importantly on his success in producing income 
growth during the election year.  The implications of these parameter estimates may be illustrated by 
considering what might have happened if Roosevelt had happened to stand for reelection under less 
favorable economic circumstances than those prevailing in 1936.  For example, what if real income per 
capita had fallen by 6.4 percent rather than growing by 11.3 percent during the election year?  Lest this 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
11  The increase in turnout between 1932 and 1936 ranged from 2 to 22 percent, except in Kentucky (−6 percent) 
and Pennsylvania (+45 percent).  Excluding these two outliers leaves the estimated effects of turnout on 
Roosevelt’s vote virtually unchanged.   
12  Additional regression analyses, not detailed here, suggest that the relationship between turnout gains and 
Roosevelt support was even stronger in both 1932 and 1940 than in 1936.  Thus, the cumulative contribution of 
new voters to the building of a Democratic majority was even greater than is evident in the calculations reported 
here—perhaps on the order of five percentage points. 
13  Data on the rural farm population, foreign born whites, and blacks are from the Historical Census Browser 
developed by the University of Virginia’s Geospatial and Statistical Data Center 
(http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus).     12 
possibility seem far-fetched, we note that real income per capita did fall by 6.4 percent only two years 
later—with dire consequences for the Democrats in the 1938 midterm election. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of our historical simulation comparing Roosevelt’s actual 
performance in the 1936 election with his hypothetical performance under the economic conditions 
prevailing in 1938.  Of course, any calculation along these lines must be far from exact.  Most 
importantly, the statistical estimates of the effect of state-level economic conditions in Table 1 provide 
no direct evidence regarding the additional impact of national economic conditions on Roosevelt’s 
vote.  Voters undoubtedly attended also to the national economy, but since that does not vary cross-
sectionally, we have no way to measure its importance here.  However, rough calculations based on 
aggregate vote shifts comport with more detailed calculations based on data from the modern era in 
suggesting that the impact of national economic conditions were probably similar in magnitude to the 
impact of state economic conditions, making the total effect of the economy twice as large as 
suggested by the parameter estimates in Table 1.
15
 
  Thus, in the absence of better evidence, we simply 
assume that the average parameter estimate for the effect of state-level income changes in 1936 in 
Table 1 can be applied both to state-level changes and to the national change.   
***  Table 2  *** 
 
The resulting calculation suggests that under the economic conditions prevailing in 1938 
Roosevelt would have received only about 48 percent of the two-party vote outside the South in 1936.  
                                                                                                                                                     
14  We also examined regression models including various subsets of these economic and demographic variables 
in addition to those reported in Table 1.  None produced more sensible results.   
15  We know that in the non-southern states, Hoover’s share of the two-party popular vote dropped 17 percentage 
points when real income fell by 15 percent in 1932; Roosevelt’s vote share increased by 4 percentage points 
when real income grew by 11 percent in 1936.  The former shift suggests a 1-to-1 correspondence between 
income changes and vote shares; the later a 3-to-1 correspondence.  Averaging these two estimates suggests that 
a president’s popular vote share might shift by roughly 2/3 of one percent with each one percent shift in real 
income.  That total impact is approximately double the estimated effect of state-level variation in Table 1, with 
the difference presumably attributable to voters’ sensitivity to national economic conditions.  Rough tests using 
data from post-war presidential elections similarly suggest a total effect about twice as large as the state-level   13 
More importantly, he would have lost 17 of the 46 states he actually carried, including New York, 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan.  Even with a lock on the Solid South, he would have fallen 
just short of an Electoral College majority, bringing the New Deal realignment to an abrupt and (from 
the perspective of hindsight) very premature conclusion. 
These results provide a dramatic indication of voters’ myopia, even in a situation where the 
economic stakes were much larger than any observed in subsequent eras of American politics.  In 1934 
and 1935, Roosevelt presided over an increase in real personal income per capita of more than 17 
percentage points, recouping half of the total income lost through the preceding four years of 
depression.  Our analysis suggests that he got little or no electoral credit for doing so.  Rather, voters 
asked “What have you done for us lately?”  
Of course, the Democratic realignment was manifested not only in personal support for 
Roosevelt but also in durable Democratic majorities in Congress.  Indeed, the House of 
Representatives remained in Democratic hands for most of the next sixty years.  Thus, the dynamics of 
congressional voting in the Depression era are crucial to understanding the nature and significance of 
the New Deal realignment. 
Table 3 reports the results of a series of regression analyses relating congressional election 
outcomes to changing economic conditions through the early New Deal period.  The first four columns 
of the table present separate results for the 1934, 1936, 1938, and 1940 congressional elections; the 
fifth column presents pooled results using the data from all four election years.
16
                                                                                                                                                     
effect—though the electoral shift attributable to each percentage point change in real income seems to be 
considerably larger in the post-war period than it was in the Depression era. 
  The observations are 
non-southern congressional districts contested by both major parties in both the current and previous 
16  The 1940 election provides a natural stopping point for our analysis, since thereafter politicians and voters 
alike were increasingly distracted from economic concerns and domestic policy debates by the coming of war.  
Limiting our analysis to the period from 1932 to 1940 also allows us to avoid complications attendant on 
congressional redistricting.   14 
election cycle.
17
 
  Because there was substantial variation in the population of congressional districts in 
this era, we weight the districts by turnout.  The explanatory variables include election-year income 
changes, income changes in the off-year preceding the election, percentage changes in turnout from the 
preceding election, and the lagged vote.  The data on income changes are only available for states, not 
for specific congressional districts; for this reason, among others, we cluster the observations within 
states and report robust standard errors that allow for the possibility of correlated disturbances within 
each state. 
***  Table 3  *** 
 
The parameter estimates for congressional elections presented in Table 3 parallel those for the 
1936 presidential election in suggesting a strong effect of election-year economic conditions.  
Although no discernible effect appears in the 1934 midterm election, the estimated effect is sizable in 
each of the other three elections of the early New Deal era, and the pooled parameter estimate for all 
four elections has a t-statistic of 2.8.  By contrast, economic conditions in the off-year preceding each 
election had little apparent impact, with only one sizable parameter estimate (in 1940) and a t-statistic 
for the pooled parameter estimate of 0.7.  Increasing turnout also had a positive effect on the 
Democratic congressional vote, especially in 1934 and 1936; however, even allowing for the larger 
mean and variance of turnout changes, the political significance of this effect was only about half as 
large as the election-year income effect.  
The 1938 midterm election provides a convenient basis for comparison between the 
congressional election results presented in Table 3 and the presidential election results presented in 
Table 1.  The estimated effect of election-year income changes in 1938 is similar in magnitude to the 
average estimate in the pooled regression; the parameter estimate for the lagged vote is almost exactly 
                                            
17  We include cases in which either or both of the major party candidates also ran on minor party lines; but we 
exclude several cases in California in which the same candidate ran on both the Democratic and Republican   15 
1.0; and the estimated effects of off-year income changes and turnout changes are both very close to 
zero.  Thus, a simple scatterplot of the relationship between election-year income changes and vote 
shifts in 1938 captures the essential features of the regression analyses in Table 3 with fair accuracy.  
That scatterplot is presented in Figure 3.  The figure is constructed so as to maximize visual 
comparability with Figure 2, which presented the corresponding relationship for the 1936 presidential 
election.  The scales for the horizontal and vertical axes are unchanged, despite the fact that there was a 
good deal less variation in state-level economic conditions in 1938 than in 1936, and also somewhat 
less variation in electoral shifts.  (For visual clarity, we summarize the electoral outcome in each state 
by showing the average vote shift across all of the state’s contested congressional districts, with 
districts weighted by turnout.)   
 
***  Figure 3  *** 
 
It is clear from the general location of the data points in Figure 3 that economic conditions were 
much less propitious for the Democrats in 1938 than in 1936.  Few states registered gains in real 
income, and many states lost between 5 and 10 percent.  It is also clear that the overall relationship 
between economic conditions and vote shifts, represented in the figure by a turnout-weighted bivariate 
regression line, is noticeably less steep than the corresponding regression line in Figure 2.  
Nevertheless, the relationship is strong enough to account for differences of up to five percentage 
points in the expected Democratic vote over the range of  economic conditions observed in 1938. 
As with the 1936 presidential scatterplot presented in Figure 2, there is no obvious ideological 
logic to the most prominent residuals in Figure 3.  The Democratic vote held up better in 1938 in 
Kentucky, Maine, and Maryland than elsewhere; but these states would hardly be expected to appear in 
the vanguard of support for a further leftward shift in policy during Roosevelt’s second term.  At the 
opposite extreme, the states that slipped furthest in their levels of Democratic support between 1936 
                                                                                                                                                     
lines.   16 
and 1938 were North Dakota and Montana—prominent positive residuals in Figure 2—and 
Wisconsin—a state hardly remarkable, then or now, for its ideological conservatism. 
As with the 1936 presidential vote, we probed the robustness of the results presented in Table 3 
by examining a variety of alternative regression specifications.  Table 4 presents the most 
comprehensive of these alternative specifications, which includes as additional explanatory variables 
the real income level in each state, the rural/farm population, the proportion of foreign-born whites, the 
proportion of blacks, and the incumbency status of each congressional district.
18
 
  As in Table 3, the 
first four columns in Table 4 report the regression results for 1934, 1936, 1938, and 1940, respectively, 
while the final column reports the results of a regression pooling the data from all four election years. 
***  Table 4  *** 
 
Generally speaking, the demographic variables in Table 4 have rather unimpressive and 
sometimes puzzling estimated effects, just as they did in our analyses of the 1936 presidential vote in 
Table 1.  Income levels have inconsistent estimated effects across election years, and only approach 
conventional levels of statistical significance in 1940.  The percentage of blacks in each state seems to 
depress the Democratic vote in 1934, increase it in 1938, and have no discernible effect in 1936 or 
1940.  The percentages of farmers and foreign-born whites have consistent but small estimated 
effects—but the fact that these estimated effects are negative seems odd in light of the prominence of 
farmers and immigrants in conventional accounts of the New Deal coalition.  In short, there is little 
glimmer here of recognizably ideological responses to Roosevelt’s policies at any point in this 
sequence of elections. 
Importantly for our purposes, including additional demographic control variables in Table 4 has 
very little effect on our conclusions regarding the political significance of short-term retrospections in   17 
the building and maintenance of the Democrats’ congressional majority.  By comparison with the 
estimates reported in Table 3, the apparent impact of election-year income changes is somewhat 
smaller in 1936, somewhat larger in 1938 and 1940, and virtually unchanged in the pooled regression 
analysis.  Prior-year income changes have no apparent effect in three of the four election years, just as 
in Table 3.  The persistence of Democratic support from year to year, as captured by the lagged 
congressional vote, is a bit less impressive than in Table 3, but that difference is accounted for (and 
compensated for) by the inclusion of a separate variable capturing the impact of incumbency.  
Having confirmed the robustness of the basic findings reported in Table 3, we return to the 
question of what they tell us about the nature of the New Deal realignment.  We have seen that myopic 
retrospections based upon election-year economic conditions had a powerful effect on the 
congressional vote, as they did on the presidential vote in Table 1.  We have also seen that 
congressional voting patterns displayed a good deal of continuity from year to year, reflecting the 
persistence of partisan attachments despite changing political circumstances.  Putting these two facts 
together, it appears that short-term retrospections may have had important long-term consequences for 
the development and maintenance of the Democratic majority. 
However, that conclusion requires one more step: we must assure ourselves that vote shifts 
deriving from short-term retrospections persisted from year to year along with those deriving from 
other factors, rather than being forgotten along with the economic conditions themselves.  To that end, 
the regression analyses reported in Table 5 repeat the analyses in Table 3, but with the lagged vote in 
each election year decomposed into two separate parts—one reflecting non-economic forces and the 
other reflecting voters’ reactions to economic conditions in the previous election year.  The 
decomposition is based on a series of regression analyses like the ones presented in Table 3, but with 
the direct effect of economic conditions in each election used recursively to estimate the indirect effect 
                                                                                                                                                     
18  The first four of these five additional explanatory variables are only available for states, not for specific 
congressional districts.  As in the case of income changes, using state values for each of the districts in a given   18 
of the same economic conditions in subsequent elections.
19   
 
***  Table 5  *** 
 
In 1934, the persistence of voters’ economic verdict from 1932 was noticeably weaker than the 
persistence of the non-economic component of the 1932 vote.  That may reflect the change in partisan 
control from 1932 to 1934, or simply the magnitude of the economic disaster that voters were 
responding to in 1932.  In each of the other three election years, however, vote shifts based upon short-
term economic conditions seem to have been at least as durable as those stemming from non-economic 
sources.  Pooling the data from all four election years produces a regression coefficient of .738 for 
economic judgments internalized from the previous election cycle, as against .871 for non-economic 
judgments internalized from the previous election cycle.  (For purposes of comparison, we note that 
the latter figure matches nicely with estimates of the stability of party identification at the individual 
level in modern panel surveys.) 
The bottom panel of Table 5 illustrates the implications of these internalized economic judgments 
for the dynamics of the New Deal realignment.  The first row shows the average Democratic vote share 
across non-southern congressional districts (weighted by turnout).  The second row shows the portion 
of the Democratic vote attributable to contemporary economic retrospections, based upon the 
parameter estimate for “Election-Year Income Change” in the regression analysis.  The third row 
                                                                                                                                                     
state probably induces considerable measurement error. 
19  More specifically, we begin by regressing the 1932 congressional vote on the 1930 congressional vote plus 
1932 income changes.  The estimated effect of 1932 income changes on the 1932 vote (.4623), multiplied by the 
sum of the 1932 income change in each district plus the national income change, serves as our “Lagged Vote—
Economic” in the 1934 regression; the 1932 vote in each district minus this economic component serves as our 
“Lagged Vote—Non-Economic” in the 1934 regression.  In the 1936 regression the “Lagged Vote—Economic” 
includes the estimated direct effect of the 1934 economy on the 1934 vote (that is, .033 from Table 5 multiplied 
by the sum of 1934 national- and district-level income changes) plus the estimated carryover of 1932 economic 
conditions in 1934 (that is, .366 from Table 5 multiplied by the lagged economic vote in the 1934 regression); 
the 1934 vote in each district minus this economic component serves as our “Lagged Vote—Non-Economic” in 
the 1936 regression.  We proceed in similar fashion to partition the 1936 vote into economic and non-economic 
components for incorporation in the 1938 regression, then partition the 1938 vote into economic and non-
economic components for incorporation in the 1940 regression.    19 
shows the portion of the Democratic vote attributable to previous economic retrospections as reflected 
in the parameter estimate labeled “Lagged Vote—Economic.”  The final row subtracts the immediate 
and internalized economic effects from the average Democratic vote, leaving an estimate of residual 
Democratic support net of economic influences. 
It should be obvious that these calculations involve a good deal of uncertainty, and the results 
should be considered no more than suggestive.  Nevertheless, they suggest that the long-term effects of 
short-term economic retrospections played a crucial role in the New Deal realignment.  The 
Democratic Party’s congressional majority in 1934 depended heavily on the persistence of partisan 
attachments forged in the economic crisis of 1932 and reflected in the statistical relationship between 
election-year income changes and Democratic votes in that pivotal year.  The impressive persistence 
and accumulation of these economically-based partisan attachments in subsequent election years 
protected the Democratic majority from fatal erosion in the face of short-term economic fluctuations, 
most notably in 1938.      
We conclude this section by reiterating how dramatically our interpretation of the elections of the 
1930s changes the conventional understanding of the realignment.  In our interpretation, the voters 
made no judgment about the ideological appropriateness of New Deal policies.  Nor did they provide 
any cumulative assessment of the economic performance of the Roosevelt administration.  Their 
reactions were decidedly myopic.  In 1936, for example, they cared only about 1936 conditions; the 
substantial gains in real income in the preceding two years were water under the bridge.  Roosevelt’s 
reelection—and the realignment—depended solely on that one year, and if 1936 conditions had 
approximated those prevailing in 1938 he probably would have been defeated.  Judgments about the 
role of the government in economic life, the value of laissez-faire economics, or specific aspects of the 
New Deal program were irrelevant—or, at least, unnecessary to account for the outcome. 
At the same time, however, the sequence of election outcomes manifested a good deal of 
persistence stemming in significant part from the extent to which voters developed partisan   20 
attachments consistent with their myopic short-term assessments of economic conditions in each 
successive election year.  The fact that times were good in 1936 had a significant impact on the 1938 
congressional vote because much of the heightened Democratic support stemming from good times in 
1936 carried over to 1938.  Of course, the fact that times were also good in 1935 had no such effect, 
since 1935 was not an election year and thus was not incorporated in voters’ party identifications or 
voting behavior in 1936 or, as best we can tell, thereafter.  The result is not quite a “running tally” in 
the sense of Fiorina (1981), but more like a “limping tally.”  
 
The U.S. Experience in Comparative Perspective 
Figure 4 summarizes the timing and magnitude of the Great Depression in eight democracies, as 
measured by changes in real national income or Gross Domestic Product.  Although these data are, no 
doubt, subject to substantial measurement error, they convey some sense of the relative dimensions of 
the Depression in different parts of the industrialized world.
20   Britain and Sweden (in the lower left 
panel of Figure 4) experienced relatively mild declines in income in the early 1930s followed by 
substantial, steady increases through the rest of the decade.  Germany and France (in the lower right 
panel) suffered somewhat steeper income declines in the early 1930s, followed by rapid growth in the 
case of Germany but prolonged stagnation in the case of France.  Australia (in the upper right panel) 
experienced a sharp income drop in 1930 followed by a fairly steady upward trend through the rest of 
the decade, while Ireland (also in the upper right panel) seems to have experienced very little 
fluctuation in real income throughout the whole period. 
                                            
20  The four income series presented in the top panel of Figure 4 are calculated from data published in the United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook (Statistical Office of the United Nations 1949), and represent national income 
divided by the cost of living.  The four income series presented in the bottom panel of the figure are calculated 
from data published by Mitchell (1992), and represent GDP in constant prices.  For Britain and Sweden both 
series are available.  They are very highly correlated; however, the GDP series suggests a somewhat sharper 
depression and recovery in Britain (from 89.8 in 1932 to 118.2 in 1938, versus 96.3 and 116.6 for the national 
income series) and a somewhat milder depression and recovery in Sweden (from 96.0 in 1932 to 123.1 in 1938, 
versus 90.2 and 148.5 for the national income series).   21 
 
***  Figure 4  *** 
 
The U.S. and Canada (in the upper left panel of Figure 4) stand out both for the depth of the 
Depression and for its duration.  These data suggest that real income fell by 40 percent in the U.S. and 
by more than one-third in Canada; in both cases, 1929 income levels were not regained until 1937.  
The income data are paralleled by data on unemployment, which increased from 3.2% in 1929 to 
24.9% in 1933 in the U.S., and from 4.2% in 1929 to 26.5% in 1933 in Canada (Statistical Office of 
the United Nations 1949). 
In the U.S., the New Deal realignment replaced a profoundly conservative government with a 
liberal – critics would say radical – alternative.  The ideological shift seems entirely sensible.  
Moreover, the subsequent recovery of the national economy seems to validate the efficacy of 
Roosevelt’s dramatic policy innovations: real income per capita increased by more than 40 percent 
from 1932 to 1940.  However, the story seems a good deal less simple when we canvass the responses 
of electorates in other established democracies to the economic crises documented in Figure 4. 
As it turns out, electoral reactions to the Depression produced long-lasting realignments of 
established party systems in a bewildering variety of configurations:   
□  In Canada, voters punished the incumbent Liberal Party in 1930, giving the Conservative Party 
a comfortable parliamentary majority.  The new Conservative government could do nothing to stem 
the economic tide; real income continued to plummet and unemployment continued to escalate through 
1931, 1932, and 1933 (just as they did in the U.S.).  Conditions improved markedly in 1934 and 1935 
(again, just as they did in the U.S.), but when the Conservative government stood for reelection in 
1935 real income was still well below its 1930 level and unemployment hovered near 20 percent.  The 
voters responded by punishing the Conservatives even more vigorously than they had punished the 
Liberals in 1930; the Liberal Party, which had been repudiated by the voters only five years earlier, 
won nearly three-fourths of the seats in the new Parliament elected in 1935.  Economic conditions   22 
continued to improve markedly through the rest of the decade (just as they did in the U.S.), though 
with a notable dip in 1938 (just as in the U.S.).  By 1940, unemployment was below its 1930 level and 
real income was more than 40 percent higher than it had been a decade earlier.  The Liberal 
government was returned with overwhelming parliamentary majorities in 1940, and again in 1945, 
1949, and 1953 before finally falling in 1957. 
□  In Britain, a minority Labour government faced the voters in 1931 and lost 235 of its 287 seats 
in Parliament.  The Conservatives won a comfortable parliamentary majority, were reelected in an 
expanding economy in 1935, and remained in power through the end of World War II a decade later.  
□  In Ireland, the nationalist Fianna Fail party took power in 1932 and won a majority early in 
1933.  They have been the dominant party in Ireland ever since. 
□  In Australia, the vote share of the incumbent Labor Party fell from 49 percent (winning 46 
House seats) in 1929 to 27 percent (winning 14 House seats) in 1931.  The new United Australia Party 
won with 40 percent of the vote in 1931, the economy improved markedly, and U.A.P. held power 
through three subsequent elections in the next decade. 
□  In Sweden, a Conservative prime minister was replaced by a Liberal in 1930.  Unemployment 
escalated from 12 percent to 22 percent over the next two years.
21  Another election in 1932 brought 
the Social Democratic Party to power; unemployment  peaked in 1933 and began to decline in 1934, 
and the Social Democrats remained in power (except for a brief interlude in 1936, and sometimes in 
coalition with other parties) until 1976. 
□  In Germany, the unemployment rate doubled (from 15 percent to 30 percent) between 1930 
and 1932.  Popular support for the Nazi Party doubled over the same two years (from 18 percent in the 
Reichstag election of September 1930 to 37 percent in July 1932 and 33 percent in November 1932).  
The 1932 elections produced a legislative stalemate that ended with the appointment of Adolph Hitler 
                                            
21  Our unemployment figures are from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (Statistical Office of the United 
Nations 1949).   23 
as Chancellor in January 1933.  In March, the Reichstag ceded its powers to Hitler.  An election in 
May was marred by Nazi intimidation of the communist and social democrat parties; the former was 
banned shortly after the election, the latter in June, and all other parties in July.  Meanwhile, 
unemployment fell steadily beginning in 1933 (back to 15 percent in 1934 and below 5 percent in 
1937), real GDP expanded rapidly, and Hitler led Germany on to world war.   
A crucial feature of this brief litany of electoral responses to the Depression is that the 
ideological interpretation customarily provided for voters’ reactions in the U.S. does not turn out to 
travel well.  Where conservatives were in power when the Depression hit they were often replaced 
with liberals or socialists, as in the U.S. and Sweden.  But where liberals were in power when disaster 
struck they were often replaced with more conservative governments, as in Britain and Australia.  
Where the existing party system was oriented around non-economic issues, as in Ireland, voters 
rejected the “ins” and replaced them with “outs” whose policy positions cannot even be sensibly 
categorized as more or less ideologically appropriate to address the economic crisis.  Where the timing 
of elections forced more than one major party to stand for reelection during the worst years of the 
Depression, as in Canada and Sweden, voters seem to have been perfectly willing to reject both in turn.  
Where coalition politics discredited all of the major parties, as in Weimar Germany, fringe parties were 
the primary beneficiaries of voters’ discontents.  Simply put, there is no consistent ideological logic 
evident in voters’ responses to the Depression when we look beyond the American case. 
 
The Development of Ireland’s Party System:  The Conventional View 
…there is still a tendency to analyse Irish nationalism in the terms of its own rhetoric. 
—Hepburn (1957: xv) 
 
At the conclusion of World War I, Ireland was a colony under British rule.  The Anglo-Irish War 
of 1919-1921 ended in a treaty giving essential independence to 26 southern Ireland counties while   24 
keeping six northern counties under British rule.  Most Irish political leaders favored the Treaty, and it 
was ratified by the Dail (parliament).  Those opposing the Treaty, known as Republicans, wanted to 
hold out for full island unity in the name of Irish nationalism.  The Civil War, 1922-1923, was won by 
the pro-Treaty side, as were the 1922 and 1923 elections.
22  On principle, and to avoid the required 
loyalty oath to Britain required of members, the successful Republican candidates refused to take their 
seats in the Dail. 
By 1927, a reorganized anti-Treaty party, called Fianna Fail and led by the redoubtable Eamon de 
Valera, had reversed course about entering the Dail and had become a respected electoral competitor.  
By 1932, less than a decade after the end of the Civil War, Fianna Fail took power in coalition with the 
Labour Party.  And by the following year, de Valera won a majority in a snap election.  Just ten years 
after the end of the Civil War, the losers of that war had become the government in a free democratic 
transition. 
The conventional interpretation of the events of this period focuses on Irish nationalism.  The 
Irish preferred more nationalism to less, the argument goes, thus putting Fianna Fail ahead of its 
principal opponent, the Cumann na nGaedheal party.  Exhausted by the War of Independence and the 
Civil War, however, the Irish electorate wanted a party committed to peace and to working within the 
current governmental institutions.  Thus so long as Fianna Fail refused to take their Dail seats, the 
voters would choose their opponents, led by W. T. Cosgrave.  Hence in the June, 1927 election, 
running as a party committed to abstention from the Dail, Fianna Fail received essentially the same 
vote as their Republican predecessors. 
Once Fianna Fail entered the Dail in the month after the election, however, the voters soon lost 
interest in the less nationalist party: 
                                            
22 Both sides ran under the Sinn Fein banner in a unity ticket in 1922, but cooperation collapsed before the 
election and newspapers made clear which faction each candidate represented.  The Republicans fought the 
1923 election under considerable government harassment, including arrests of some of their candidates.  Thus   25 
In the last resort, Mr. Cosgrave’s government rested on the opposition to the rule of 
violence.  After the immediate threat of violence had been removed, his support began to 
crumble (Meenan 1970, 33). 
 
The key to Fianna Fail’s electoral success…was that they held the green card in the party 
politics of independent Ireland and, once in the Dail, played it with devastating effect 
(Fanning 1983, 100). 
 
After the assassination of a government minister, the Cosgrave government adopted a hard line 
against their domestic opponents. Fianna Fail allied with other elements of the opposition, and forced 
another election: 
   
A general election ensued in September 1927, and Fianna Fail’s vote jumped an impressive nine 
percentage points, reflecting the electors’ approval of the constitutionalist line (Garvin 1981: 156; 
see also very similar language in Rumpf and Hepburn, 1977: 103, and Carty 1981: 29). 
 
By the 1932 election, so the conventional view would have it, the voters had learned that they 
preferred Fianna Fail for its nationalist principles: 
 
As long as a majority of the electorate remained convinced that the institutions of the 
independent Irish state could not be entrusted to the charge of de Valera and his supporters, 
the Cumann na nGaedheal electoral stance as ‘defenders of the state’ remained appropriate.  
But the participation of Fianna Fail in the Dail changed all that and the slogans which had 
won the 1922 election sounded more hollow in 1932… (Fanning 1983, 107). 
 
Thus Fianna Fail took power in 1932 and went on to win a majority early in 1933.  They have been the 
dominant party in Ireland ever since, as Figure 5 demonstrates with data from Gallagher (1993).  As 
Carty (1981, 29) put it, “Despite the rise and fall of other parties, Fianna Fail’s position has remained 
one of unchallenged dominance.”    
        *** Figure 5 *** 
This standard interpretation of the founding of Ireland’s party system has several attractive 
features.  First, it corresponds to the understanding of political elites at the time.  Second, it accounts in 
                                                                                                                                                     
while neither election is a perfect barometer of popular sentiment, the Republicans were clear losers with just   26 
broad outline for the electoral outcomes.  And third, it gives a central role to the Irish electorate for 
making their own democratic choices about their future after centuries of repressive British rule.  After 
so much misery and so many failed revolts, the story of newly independent Irish voters enforcing a 
non-violent nationalism on their political leaders is a very appealing interpretation of twentieth century 
Irish political history.  No surprise, then, that this view recurs over and over throughout the political 
science literature on Ireland. 
But is it true?  There are some reasons for legitimate doubt.  First, the story puts heavy 
intellectual demands on the average voter.  After all the violence and radical change brought on by the 
war of independent and the civil war, voter turnout never exceeded 68% in the elections of 1923, June 
1927, and September, 1927.  During these critical early elections, a third of the electorate could not be 
bothered.  In 1923, the most important of the lot, more than 40% of the electorate was AWOL.
23  How 
dedicated was the electorate? 
Were Irish voters really recalibrating Fianna Fail’s commitment to democratic principles on the 
basis of its entry into the Dail?  That style of electoral interpretation has gone out of fashion since the 
development of survey research, precisely because the ideological considerations and political debates 
that loom so large in the minds of politicians and professors leave so little trace in the thoughts of 
ordinary voters.  Of course, in the immediate aftermath of a war for independence and a civil war, 
Ireland might be an exception.  The point is that without survey evidence and without detailed analysis 
of electoral returns, neither of which currently exists, the conventional view remains an hypothesis, not 
a summary of persuasive evidence.   
Moreover, the electoral details matter.  Fianna Fail gained support from 1927 through 1933 in 
quite different ways in different parts of the country—sometimes steadily (Wicklow), sometimes 
quickly at first followed by a near-plateau (Cork Borough), and sometimes slowly initially, followed 
                                                                                                                                                     
27.5% of the 1923 vote.   27 
by a jump (Dublin North).  Rumpf and Hepburn (1977) discuss the regional and temporal variations 
with more care than most, but neither they nor anyone else has shown how the conventional nationalist 
view can account for these patterns.  Indeed, the late, sharp rise in Fianna Fail support from 1932 to 
1933 in Dublin, Donegal, Louth and elsewhere, when the voters had long been aware of where the 
party stood on constitutional and nationalist principles, is somewhat mysterious from this point of view 
unless one employs another ad hockery about constitutionalist inferences from the party’s year in 
power.  And that inference would have to have escaped the voters in Carlow-Kilkenny, Cork West, 
Kildare, Longford-Westmeath, Meath, Tipperary, and Wexford, where Fianna Fail support was steady 
or fell from 1932 to 1933. 
What is the alternative to the conventional nationalist interpretation?  The first requirement is that 
less be expected of the electorate.  To be sure, there is little doubt that positions taken during the civil 
war continue to structure the views of those who participated in it and their families.  The 1971 Irish 
civic attitudes survey asked those respondents who were at least 20 years old in 1922 whether they or a 
relative had taken “an active part” in the civil war and on which side.  Of those who said yes, had no 
mixed participation by relatives, and had voted in 1969 for one of the two main parties (43 
respondents), 79% had voted in 1969 for the party corresponding to their relative’s  position in the war 
(recalculated from Carty 1981, 93, who percentages the tables backwards).
24  Thus there is no doubt 
that nationalist issues influenced and continue to influence some voters. 
Most Irish citizens, however, did not take an active part in the civil war.  Their descendents 
inherit the political system created by the war, but in entirely different conditions.  The old divisions 
make little sense today, and the politicians for whom they were real are retired or dead.  Thus 56% of 
Irish citizens in a 1969 Gallup survey reported that the parties are “the same,” including a majority 
                                                                                                                                                     
23 To be sure, the electoral registers were imperfect.  However, the valid votes in 1923 were 15% fewer than 
those of June, 1927, just four years later. 
24 That is, Fianna Fail for Republicans; Fine Gael for those pro-treaty.  Fully 96% of those whose relatives were 
anti-Treaty in the civil war voted Fianna Fail in 1969.     28 
within each of the three main parties, and another 13% did not know.  Just 31% saw the parties as 
genuinely different.  Yet 80% of those whose fathers were Fianna Fail members were loyal to the same 
party themselves, and two thirds of the Fine Gael fathers had passed that identity to their children as 
well (reported in Carty 1981, 80, 81).  In short, the civil war-based Irish party system has outlived its 
meaningfulness for average voters, but it continues to be passed from parents to children, and it 
continues to structure Irish political life.  De Valera indeed is a “long fellow” with a “long shadow” 
(Coogan 1993).  It is not easy to square all these facts with an intellectualist view of the founding and 
inheritance of the party system.  However, there is an alternate view in which the survey research 
findings are no surprise. 
These days, defenders of democracy seeking to interpret elections usually appeal to 
“retrospective voting,” the notion that most voters approve or disapprove the incumbents at the polls 
without understanding much about their policy choices or ideological stances (Downs 1957; Fiorina 
1981).  In particular, the state of the economy plays a large role in this interpretation of elections.  As 
we said above, our own prior work suggests that only very recent economic performance matters, not 
the overall performance of the incumbents.  In a closely balanced party system, then, good times right 
before the election maintain incumbents in office no matter what else they have done or stand for, and 
bad times get them thrown out.  As Mae West almost said, “Ideological goodness had nothing to do 
with it.” 
Amidst all the lengthy discussions of nationalism, there are occasional brief hints of this modern 
view of elections in Irish political historiography:   
 
The party’s [Fianna Fail’s] advance was further accelerated by the developing world 
economic crisis, which put particular pressure on agriculture (Rumpf and Hepburn 1977, 
103). 
 
 
Thus with [political rival Michael] Collins gone, and the government firmly set in the 
mould of orthodoxy, de Valera operated in an economic climate ever more favourable to an 
Opposition leader (Coogan 1993, 429).   29 
 
Elsewhere, Coogan (1993, 408-409) also briefly mentions adverse economic conditions before the 
election of 1932, as does Sinnott (1995: 44), but neither makes explicit causal claims.  Dunphy (1995: 
chap. 3), too, mentions poverty and poor housing in the Ireland of the Thirties, but he argues that it was 
the caliber of Fianna Fail’s program for dealing with them, not just the misery they engendered, that 
helped the party at the polls.  The great bulk of his electoral interpretation goes to other factors.  
All these discussions of economics are skimpy, and many authors ignore the topic entirely.  Thus 
Fanning (1983, 99-109) gives ten pages to the run-up to the 1932 election, discussing Fianna Fail’s 
superior organization, the government’s mishandling of the Liquor Act and its attempt to create a Red 
Scare, but nothing on the economy.  Carty (1981, 100-108) emphasizes Fianna Fail’s organization and 
nationalism, leadership, patronage, and creation of a sense of “moral community” through skillful 
communications, including its own newspaper.  Garvin (1981, 165-167) in a brief treatment of the 
1932 election focuses on Fianna Fail’s nationalist appeal.  Only Sinnott (1995, 101), employing the 
trade war with Britain and its impact on Irish agricultural exports to explain the 4.5 percentage point 
drop in Fianna Fail support in 1937, give causal priority to economic retrospections, and that only after 
the key period establishing Fianna Fail’s dominance had passed.  With rare exceptions, the economy is 
a sideshow in interpretations of early Irish elections, if it is mentioned at all. 
 
Irish Elections and the Depression Era Economy 
  Ignoring economic effects on Thirties elections is a questionable intellectual strategy.  The 
worldwide Depression was breaking out just as Fianna Fail took power.  For that and other reasons, 
Ireland faced considerable economic distress: 
 
Irish agriculture, as we have seen, was in trouble by the early 1930s.  The market for all but 
cattle had collapsed by 1931, and the halving of cattle prices between 1930 and 1934, and 
the collapse of calf prices, hit large and small farmers alike.  Agricultural incomes already   30 
in decline—they had fallen by 12.8 per cent between 1929 and 1931—now feel further as 
‘cattle exports fell in volume by 33.2 per cent between 1931 and 1934.  The value of net 
agricultural output fell by 37.6 per cent between 1929/30 and 1934/35’  (Dunphy 1995, 
151, with quotes from work by Orridge). 
 
Irish cities were, if possible, even worse off, with some of the worst slum conditions in Europe, and 
many citizens fled Ireland for the U.S., Canada, and Australia (Dunphy 1995, 42, 46).  It would be 
surprising if such drastic economic conditions, including serious malnourishment and even near-
starvation, had no political effects.  Yet the topic has gone largely unresearched. 
A large part of the reason is the unavailability of data.  The problems go well beyond the usual 
difficulties of census districts differing from constituencies, and both differing from administrative 
units.  Irish gross domestic product figures do not exist before 1938.  Rural unemployment is often 
disguised in the census figures as “family and relatives assisting” on farms.  Relief was administered in 
Dublin by a Poor Law Union was no clear administrative boundaries, and relief efforts in the counties 
varied widely among places with similar official unemployment rates.  Formal government 
unemployment surveys were done only in 1926 and 1936, and we have been unable to locate the “live 
register” figures by county for those officially seeking work in intermediate years.   
Equally importantly, Ireland uses a system of proportional representation (the single transferable 
vote), so that constituencies have multiple seats and are relatively large in population.  As a 
consequence, these noisy economic data, if they exist at all, fall into just 28 constituencies.  Some of 
these “ridings” are homogeneous.  Others contain very mixed populations of Catholics and non-
Catholics, urban and rural voters, large and small farms, all jumbled together and obscuring what are 
undoubtedly quite different electoral responses.  There are no electoral returns for smaller units.   
Lastly, the returns themselves cover four main political parties in this period, plus fringe 
candidacies, splinter groups from the main parties, and independents.  In the first 1927 election, the 
worst case, 25% of the vote went to candidates not affiliated with the four main parties.  Thus party 
shares bounce up and down in particular constituencies because some well loved local notable has   31 
retired, or has split from his party to run as an independent, or has founded a short-lived new party.  
With so few observations, these local idiosyncracies do not always average out. 
For all these reasons, statistical inference with Irish data in this period is very difficult, and 
distinguishing the conventional nationalist view of elections from retrospective voting interpretations 
is bedeviled by sheer lack of information.  It will require more painstaking investigation and careful 
interactive statistical specifications than we managed for this version of the paper to discover how 
much the Depression affected Irish electoral outcomes. 
For now, we content ourselves with making a start.  For one sector of the Irish economy is well 
measured throughout this period—agriculture.  Detailed crop reports are available by county from 
1926 onward.  Moreover, 57% of all employed males were engaged in agriculture in 1926, as were 
54% of all males in 1936 (Department of Industry and Commerce 1929, Table 3B; 1940, Table 3B).  
These substantial percentages do not include small business owners and others in small towns whose 
clientele consisted primarily of farmers and who were therefore indirectly dependent on the crops for 
their income, nor those who shipped grain, meat, and live cattle to Britain from the ports, nor many 
others.  Agriculture was the central business of Ireland in this period. 
In 1927, most Irish land under cultivation was devoted to hay and pasture for livestock.  Of the 
remaining 1.5 million acres, 650,000 were devoted to oats and 365,000 to potatoes, jointly more than 
two thirds of the total.
25  The same pattern held through the period of the late Twenties and early 
Thirties, with little variation until wheat become more important after 1934 (Central Statistical Office 
1931-1937).  Thus knowing how good the oats and potato crops were in a given year tells us perhaps 
the most reliable information we have about the state of the Irish economy in this period. 
        *** Figures 6, 7 **** 
                                            
25 The rest of the acreage was devoted to turnips with 185,000 acres, and smaller amounts of wheat, barley, rye, 
mangels, sugar beets, cabbage, flax, fruit, and other minor categories. 
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Figures 6 and 7 show the total annual production of oats and potatoes in the Irish Free State (the 
southern 26 counties) during the late Twenties and early Thirties (Central Statistics Office, 1931-
1937).  We have also indicated the years in which elections took place, along with the result.  In both 
instances, the result is striking:  oats and potatoes did well and poorly in the same years.  Moreover, 
good harvests that preceded an election kept incumbents in power.  Bad years reduced their majority or 
removed them from office.
26 
 Thus Irish nationalism is not the only possible interpretation of the broad patterns of electoral 
outcomes in Ireland in the Thirties.  Myopic retrospection will also serve:  If Irish voters turned against 
incumbents when the harvest was bad and rewarded them when the harvest was good, then the 
outcomes of the two 1927 elections and the 1932 and 1933 elections fall into place.  The same 
economic perspective that undermines the conventional interpretation of the American realignment 
during the Depression subverts the standard view of Ireland during that period as well. 
Now of course, aggregate correlations at the national level cannot be decisive.  Neither for the 
economic interpretation nor for the nationalist view has the necessary detailed treatment of individual 
constituencies been produced to allay all doubts.  For reasons already mentioned, doing so is a 
complex task, which we have not completed.  We simply note that the case for the conventional view 
is weaker than it may seem.  Irish nationalism may have played a role in the elections, but economic 
conditions may have been equally influential or more so.  As de Valera, the leader of Fianna Fail 
during this period—a master of nationalist rhetoric but no fool about human motivations—put it 
himself, “If men are hungry, they will not be too particular about the ultimate principles of the 
organization they would join, if that organization promises to give them bread” (cited in Dunphy 1995, 
140). 
 
                                            
26 The four Irish elections noted in the charts occurred in June, 1927, mid-September 1927, February 1932, and 
January 1933.  The immediately preceding crops are therefore taken to be those of 1926, 1927, 1931, and 1932,   33 
 
Social Credit Sweeps Alberta 
The functioning of the democratic process in Alberta during the rise of the Social Credit 
movement provides a much needed corrective to the abstract concepts of the classical 
philosophers of democracy from John Locke to John Dewey. 
            – John A. Irving (1959, ix-x) 
 
The politics of the Canadian prairie in the Depression years and afterward raise a variety of 
puzzling questions for any ideological interpretation of electoral politics: 
□  Why did the adjacent provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan react so differently to the Great 
Depression, with the former electing a funny money party led by a charismatic preacher and the latter 
electing an avowedly socialist government?  As Lipset acknowledged in a revised edition of his classic 
study of agrarian socialism (1968, xxii), “There has not yet been an adequate explanation, or even a 
detailed descriptive account of the factors involved that resulted in such different reactions from two 
quite similar social units.” 
□  How did these ideological parties of the right and left both manage to build durable electoral 
pluralities in the years following the Depression?  In Saskatchewan, the economic hardships seem to 
have led directly to the eventual demise of the incumbent Conservatives, as Figure 8 suggests.  
Conversely, the socialists profited.  As Silverstein (1968, 435-436) noted, “While the socialists in 
Saskatchewan were elected as a reaction to the deprivations of the great depression, they were retained 
in the most extended period of prosperity the province had ever known.”  Indeed, the socialists in 
Saskatchewan won five consecutive provincial elections and governed without interruption from 1944 
through 1964.   
      *** Figure 8 *** 
In Alberta, the Depression took just the opposite course, ruining the incumbent socialist party, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
respectively.   34 
United Farmers of Alberta, as Figure 9 shows.  Coming from near irrelevancy and winning for the first 
time in this period, the right-leaning Social Credit Party won nine consecutive provincial elections and 
governed without interruption from 1935 through 1971 (see Figure 10). 
    *** Figures 9, 10  **** 
□  How did many of the same voters who regularly elected Social Credit governments in Alberta 
and CCF (socialist) governments in Saskatchewan continue to support mainstream parties in Canadian 
federal elections?  (Bennett and Krueger (1968, 359) noted that “the prevailing pattern of 
Saskatchewan voting can be summarized by the remark: ‘They vote CCF in provincial elections, and 
Conservative in Federal.  It makes sense only if you live here.’”   
Bennett and Krueger’s own proposed solution to the last of these puzzles seems to us to go a long 
way toward resolving the first two as well.  “The sense in this situation,” they wrote (Bennett and 
Krueger 1968, 359), “is clear enough; the farmers voted for those parties that furnished or were 
associated with solutions to their problems, regardless of ideological doctrine.” 
Our final example of voters’ responses to the Depression comes from Alberta, where voters 
driven to desperation by a combination of national and local economic crises abandoned all of the 
province’s established political parties in favor of an improbable, totally untried alternative, the Social 
Credit Party.  We have nothing to add to existing scholarship on the remarkable rise of Social Credit; 
indeed, most of our description of the events is repeated verbatim from the detailed historical account 
of Irving (1959).  Nevertheless, the case seems to us to shed considerable light on the combustible 
potential of blind retrospection under conditions of economic distress.   
“In 1935,” as Morton (1950, 286) put it, “the rural electors of Alberta refused to listen to their 
former leaders.  They closed their ears to reason; in their despair, they sought only a promise of 
salvation.”  Although early Social Credit members embodied a certain “reforming impulse” (Finkel 
1989: 40), careful analysis of the subsequent vote shows that they were what they appeared to be—a 
catch-all party whose appeal had little to do with conventional economic cleavages or policies.  The   35 
voters’ desire for “a strong-willed, dauntless leader who would take them out of the wilderness” 
(Irving 1951, 340) produced one of the most colorful and chilling episodes in the history of modern 
democratic politics. 
As we have already seen, the national government of Canada had been in Liberal hands before 
passing to the Conservative Party in 1930.  At the provincial level, an agrarian populist party, the 
United Farmers of Alberta, had been in power since 1921.  By the early 1930s the U.F.A. was split 
between monetary reformers and socialists, but a conference of farm and labor leaders in the summer 
of 1932 gave the socialists the upper hand, and a successful by-election the following winter 
 
gave rise to a buoyant optimism within U.F.A. circles concerning the future of their 
movement in Alberta politics.  After years of searching, the key to that future had been 
discovered.  It was not monetary reform, as many had long and erroneously supposed.  It 
was socialism (Irving 1959, 148).  
 
In the summer of 1933 U.F.A. leaders played a prominent role in the creation of a national 
socialist party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.  Most of the U.F.A. members of the 
federal parliament pledged their support to the C.C.F., which in turn supported the U.F.A. provincial 
government of Alberta.  Thus, Alberta entered the first provincial election campaign of the Depression 
era with what was, at least nominally, North America’s first socialist government. 
The central figure in Alberta’s Social Credit movement was William Aberhart, a charismatic 
preacher, educator, and radio broadcaster.  Though he had earlier dismissed the Social Credit 
philosophy as “crazy,” he was won over by a highly popularized version he encountered in a book 
borrowed from a colleague in the summer of 1932.  He “decided that Social Credit was exactly what 
the people of Alberta needed to redeem their province from the depths into which the bankers and 
financiers had plunged it” (Irving 1959, 48-49)—and he proceeded to give it to them. 
Aberhart’s crusade on behalf of Social Credit drew upon the resources and prestige of the 
Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute, a powerful religious institution which he had built and directed   36 
throughout the 1920s.  Thus, by happenstance, the Social Credit Party of Alberta was “an extension of 
an already well-established fundamentalist and prophetic movement.  . . . Under his leadership the 
Social Credit movement glided almost imperceptibly from a religious to an educational to a social to a 
political movement, but throughout that evolution the people’s perception of Aberhart as a Man of God 
was never dimmed and was one of the principal factors in inspiring them with loyalty and devotion to 
the Social Credit movement” (Irving 1959, 50, 259). 
Aberhart and his followers employed an impressive variety of organizational and propaganda 
techniques, including study groups, parades, open-air meetings, and a “United Mammoth Basket 
Picnic” (Irving 1959, 97-99).  Aberhart’s radio broadcasts spread the Social Credit gospel throughout 
the province.  Often the broadcasts featured a “Man from Mars” who personified the confusion of 
ordinary Albertans in the face of economic chaos.  For example, in a special broadcast timed to 
coincide with the U.F.A. convention in January 1935,  
 
The ‘Man from Mars’ appeared in person, leaning heavily on a staff and wearing a long 
white robe, a white beard, and Arab head-dress.  His ‘perplexities’ were still uppermost in 
his mind.  He could not understand why people were not receiving enough food and 
clothing in a land where food and clothing were being needlessly destroyed.  Why were 
some people driving around in big cars, well-fed and prosperous, while others did not have 
even the barest necessities of life?  Aberhart informed the Martian visitor that, if he could 
stay for the meeting, he would learn that Social Credit was the only way out of the present 
financial chaos, the only solution of the paradox of ‘poverty in the midst of plenty.’ (Irving 
1959, 113) 
 
Until just a few months before the 1935 provincial election, Social Credit retained the character 
of a social movement rather than a political party.  Nevertheless, 
 
During the summer and autumn [of 1934] Social Credit speakers did not hesitate to whip 
up the people’s resentment at the government’s seeming indifference to their sufferings.  
Small-town weeklies began to suggest in their editorial columns that thousands of people 
were persuaded that Aberhart was the Moses of a new economic deal.  It followed that the  
Social Credit movement should enter politics without further delay.” (Irving 1959, 121).   
 
The Social Credit platform called for the distribution of $25 monthly Basic Dividends to every   37 
citizen, the establishment of Just Prices on all goods and services, and a suspension of foreclosures 
pending the issuance of interest-free loans by the provincial government.  Critics charged that 
 
‘basic dividends’ could not be issued in Alberta because of constitutional limitations, and 
that, if they could be initiated, inflation would result.  The prevailing attitude of educated 
people in the small towns to such arguments was aptly summed up by a local editor: ‘The 
hope of the people, long deferred, has made hearts sick.  Desperate diseases require 
desperate remedies.  Perhaps people cannot be blamed for accepting unconstitutional and 
unintelligent prescriptions when constitutional and rational ones are platitudinous’” (Irving 
1959, 121). 
 
According to Irving (1959, 256), 
 
interviews are replete with admissions of a lack of understanding of the technical 
mechanisms or procedures that would be involved in carrying out monetary reform or in 
the provision of basic dividends and the just price.  All such matters, people constantly 
insisted, could safely be left to Aberhart and the experts he would call in to implement his 
Social Credit programme. 
 
Editorialists railed in vain against “the uncritical belief of Aberhart’s followers in Social Credit 
as a magic formula” (Irving 1959, 86).  The Economic Safety League, a pro-business interest group, 
complained that “the whole Social Credit scheme is impracticable.  It can be defended only by those 
who close their eyes to simple reasoning or those who are utterly cynical and reckless in what they say 
to electors.  The religious atmosphere of Social Credit blinds people to these dangers” (Irving 1959, 
362).
 27 
                                            
27  The critique of Social Credit provided in a pamphlet issued by the Economic Safety League (quoted by Irving 
1959, 361-362) sheds light both on the flavor of the Social Credit plan and on the exasperation of its opponents 
at its apparent illogic:  “Social Credit proposes to issue toy or make-believe money (which it calls credit) at the 
rate of $10,000,000 a month.  It does not disclose any method by which this toy money can be given the same 
purchasing power as Canadian money. . . . Existing provincial taxes are about $15,000,000 a year.  Dividend 
payments alone would require $120,000,000, which is eight times this revenue. . . . Mr. Aberhart himself admits 
the need for revenue, but does not show how it can be obtained.  His attempts to do so are childish. . . . In 1933, 
Retail Sales were $112,000,000.  How can anyone believe that these sales contained $120,000,000 in price 
spreads. . . .  Social Credit claims to be able to pay $120,000,000 a year with a much smaller sum (such as 
$10,000,000) if the toy-money is turned over fast enough.  This is a crude fallacy.  $120,000,000 a year can be 
paid with 10,000,000 dollar coins, notes, or even dollar-certificates if these are used over and over again (12 
times a year is the example chosen).  But the Government cannot use the dollars a second time till it gets them 
back from the public.  The process of getting them back is called taxation. . . . Since continued inflation will   38 
The appeal of Social Credit no doubt stemmed in part from its resonance with existing political 
ideas; “in ‘explaining’ the causes of the depression it did not run counter to, but rather accentuated, the 
extremely hostile attitudes towards the existing economic system that had arisen in a period 
characterized by ‘poverty in the midst of plenty.’ . . . The response of many farmers in Alberta to the 
doctrines propounded by Aberhart was due, in some measure, to the fact that he was merely pouring 
old wine into new bottles. . . . Socialism, as contrasted with Social Credit, had no real roots in the 
Alberta community” (Irving 1959, 334, 227, 344). 
The electoral potency of the Social Credit movement was enhanced by the weakness of voters’ 
attachments to the existing political parties.  A non-partisan territorial government had been succeeded 
by unbroken Liberal Party dominance from 1905 to 1921, at which point an agrarian populist uprising 
brought the U.F.A. to power.  According to Irving (1959, 230), “The traditional national parties had 
been under criticism even before the province entered Confederation; and after 1905 there is a 
continuous tradition of great dissatisfaction with the conventional party system. . . . The operation of 
democracy in Alberta in terms of the two-party system had therefore been tenuous and uncertain.” 
As for the incumbent provincial government, as Morton (1950, 287) put it, “the U.F.A. was old 
in the sense that it had been tried.”  The U.F.A. election manifesto 
 
surveyed ‘the notable record of achievement’ of the farmers’ administration in many fields, 
outlined the social dividends being paid to the people of Alberta, and concluded by setting 
forth in sixteen clauses the further steps that were necessary for the realization of the 
ultimate objectives of the U.F.A. movement.  Replying to the challenge of the Social Credit 
movement, the government claimed that it had brought Alberta through the greatest 
depression in the world’s history to better advantage than any other government anywhere 
(Irving 1959, 352).   
 
Regarding the possibility of more radical change, the U.F.A. declared that it was hamstrung by 
Alberta’s shortage of sovereign powers and the province’s economic dependence on the rest of 
                                                                                                                                                     
make the toy-money valueless; and since the means for raising $120,000,000 a year are absurd, the whole Social 
Credit scheme is impracticable.”   39 
Canada. 
The voters were clearly not impressed by these excuses.  After his final campaign rally, U.F.A. 
Premier R. G. Reid overheard a young man “say, to nobody in particular, ‘Well, I guess Social Credit’s 
no darn good, but who’s there to vote for anyway—I guess I’ll vote for Social Credit anyway’” (Irving 
1951, 330-331).  Many others did the same.  The result was a startling political earthquake, even by 
Depression-era standards.  The fledgling Social Credit Party won 56 of the 63 seats in the provincial 
parliament; the incumbent U.F.A. won none. 
Voters who lined up to receive their $25 bonuses on the morning after the election were to be 
disappointed.  Nevertheless, as Irving (1959, 290) concluded, 
To Social Crediters the provincial election of 1935 was a glorious episode in a glorious 
movement.  To the leaders of the U.F.A. it was a demoralizing ordeal from which they 
were never fully to recover.  To Liberals and Conservatives it was an exhibition of mass 
hysteria unparalleled in the history of democracy.   
 
As Johnson (1979) puts it, the Social Credit Party in Alberta was “an accident of history.” 
Conclusion 
  Looking at evidence from the United States, Ireland, and two Canadian prairie provinces, along 
with an array of Thirties election outcomes in Europe, we have argued for an understanding of partisan 
alignments and realignments quite different from the usual contemporary views.  Most voters, we 
argue, are overwhelmed by the complexities of politics in the best of times, and doubly so when they 
are under great economic pressure in recessions and depressions.  Not knowing what the best policies 
are, they content themselves with asking at election time whether events have gone well or badly 
lately.  Then they vote that myopic judgment.   
  When the state of the economy during the election season is particularly dreadful, as it surely 
was during the Depression, the voters feel more strongly about their retrospections.  Then they form 
strong partisan aversions to the incumbents, and strong attachments to the parties that replace them if   40 
times improve.  The resulting preferences endure in less stressful periods and are passed on to their 
children, imposing a long-term stamp on the party system.  The voters will adopt respectable 
ideological explanations for their behavior, the policies of the lucky party will be enacted, and a 
country may be substantially remade.  The realignment period may then appear to political scientists 
and historians as an intellectual decision by the electorate.  But we find in the cases we have examined 
that the evidence for all such interpretations is weak.  Elites debate policy alternatives, but the 
electorate as a whole votes on another basis. 
  This view of democracy is less cheery than the romantic alternatives, and thus less appealing.  
Its skepticism raises a host of new questions.  And it imposes a substantial obligation on those who 
propound it to make normative sense of the largely successful workings on contemporary democratic 
governments, an obligation we are not yet ready to fulfill.  Nevertheless, just as a critical step toward 
democracy occurred when intellectuals lost faith that the king had been appointed by God, so also a 
similar step needs to be taken in shaking off blind obeisance to the divine right of voters.  An 
empirically honest defense of democracy is not yet in sight.  But the first step is to get the history right.  
We have attempted to take a step in that direction.  There is a great deal more to do.   41 
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Table 1:  Retrospective Voting in FDR’s 1936 Landslide 
 
Dependent variable is the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in non-southern states.  
States are weighted by turnout.  Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard 
errors in parentheses). 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1936 Income Change 
(%) 
.396 
(.166) 
.390 
(.156) 
.283 
(.084) 
---  .303 
(.204) 
.272 
(.119) 
1935 Income Change 
(%) 
.024 
(.092) 
.069 
(.089) 
---  ---  .121 
(.134) 
--- 
1934 Income Change 
(%) 
.019 
(.087) 
.057 
(.083) 
---  ---  .150 
(.107) 
--- 
1933 Income Change 
(%) 
−.130 
(.147) 
.065 
(.140) 
---  ---  .093 
(.179) 
--- 
Income Level 
(1929 $100s) 
---  ---  ---  1.031 
(.941) 
.391 
(.962) 
.460 
(.916) 
Rural/Farm 
(%) 
---  ---  --- 
 
−.113 
(.159) 
−.051 
(.162) 
.003 
(.158) 
White Foreign Born 
(%) 
---  ---  ---  −.391 
(.180) 
−.016 
(.252) 
−.102 
(.211) 
Black 
(%) 
---  ---  ---  −.389 
(.219) 
−.248 
(.242) 
−.355 
(.206) 
Turnout Change 
(%) 
---  .125 
(.054) 
.112 
(.050) 
.094 
(.059) 
.130 
(.059) 
.117 
(.056) 
1932 Vote 
(%) 
.613 
(.094) 
.705 
(.097) 
.698 
(.094) 
.690 
(.125) 
.752 
(.122) 
.704 
(.117) 
Intercept  20.83 
(6.12) 
13.16 
(6.63) 
16.35 
(6.05) 
19.89 
(8.44) 
9.65 
(9.20) 
14.94 
(8.19) 
 
Std error of regression  3.07  2.88  2.83  3.04  2.87  2.85 
Adjusted R
2  .53  .59  .60  .54  .59  .59 
N (non-southern states)  37  37  37  37  37  37 
 
 
Table 2:  The 1936 Election With a 1938 Economy 
 
  1936 Conditions 
(Actual) 
1938 Conditions 
(Simulated) 
National Income Change 
(%) 
+11.3  −6.4 
Roosevelt Vote, Non-South 
(%) 
60.1  48.2 
States Carried 
(including South) 
46/48  29/48 
Roosevelt Electoral Votes 
(including South) 
523/531  255/531   45 
Table 3:  Retrospective Voting in Congressional Elections, 1934-1940 
 
Dependent variable is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in non-southern congressional 
districts contested by both major parties.  Districts are weighted by turnout.  Ordinary least squares 
regression parameter estimates (with robust standard errors in parentheses). 
 
  1934  1936  1938  1940  Pooled 
Election-Year  
Income Change (%) 
.002 
(.086) 
.277 
(.127) 
.242 
(.125) 
.519 
(.264) 
.182 
(.064) 
Prior Year 
Income Change (%) 
.024 
(.075) 
.082 
(.079) 
.033 
(.125) 
.265 
(.167) 
.026 
(.042) 
Turnout Change 
(%) 
.051 
(.021) 
.068 
(.018) 
−.011 
(.053) 
.020 
(.030) 
.024 
(.015) 
Lagged Vote 
(%) 
.773 
(.054) 
.876 
(.048) 
1.047 
(.034) 
.796 
(.042) 
.867 
(.017) 
Intercept  13.84 
(2.99) 
2.22 
(4.25) 
−7.56 
(1.94) 
5.10 
(2.39) 
Election 
fixed effects 
 
Std error of regression  6.27  5.13  5.07  4.62  5.45 
R
2  .62  .78  .84  .84  .79 
N (non-southern 
districts) 
299  304  306  304  1213 
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Table 4:  Congressional Voting with Demographic Controls, 1934-1940 
 
Dependent variable is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in non-southern congressional 
districts contested by both major parties.  Districts are weighted by turnout.  Ordinary least squares 
regression parameter estimates (with robust standard errors in parentheses). 
 
  1934  1936  1938  1940  Pooled 
Election-Year  
Income Change (%) 
.020 
(.080) 
.188 
(.139) 
.362 
(.149) 
.567 
(.272) 
.171 
(.065) 
Prior Year 
Income Change (%) 
.029 
(.081) 
.068 
(.088) 
.049 
(.122) 
.226 
(.148) 
.052 
(.046) 
Income Level 
(1929 $100s) 
.475 
(.968) 
−.293 
(.954) 
.010 
(1.168) 
−1.180 
(.664) 
−.183 
(.416) 
Rural/Farm 
(%) 
−.069 
(.101) 
−.095 
(.101) 
−.010 
(.169) 
−.235 
(.100) 
−.104 
(.040) 
White Foreign Born 
(%) 
−.137 
(.211) 
−.104 
(.268) 
−.095 
(.245) 
−.027 
(.106) 
−.092 
(.086) 
Black 
(%) 
−.502 
(.217) 
.143 
(.225) 
.485 
(.198) 
.024 
(.154) 
.058 
(.117) 
Turnout Change 
(%) 
.039 
(.020) 
.072 
(.021) 
.021 
(.046) 
.043 
(.027) 
.025 
(.015) 
Incumbency 
(−1=Rep; 0=Open; 
1=Dem) 
.77 
(.64) 
.80 
(.58) 
.87 
(.33) 
1.20 
(.68) 
.81 
(.26) 
Lagged Vote 
(%) 
.771 
(.065) 
.827 
(.062) 
.973 
(.037) 
.714 
(.065) 
.817 
(.028) 
Intercept  15.28 
(6.43) 
9.99 
(5.59) 
−3.36 
(10.80) 
22.55 
(7.61) 
Election 
fixed effects 
 
Std error of regression  6.20  5.09  4.89  4.46  5.39 
R
2  .63  .79  .86  .85  .79 
N (non-southern 
districts) 
293  304  306  304  1207 
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Table 5:  The Persistence and Impact of Economic Partisanship, 1934-1940 
 
Dependent variable is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in non-southern congressional 
districts contested by both major parties.  Districts are weighted by turnout.  Ordinary least squares 
regression parameter estimates (with robust standard errors in parentheses). 
 
  1934  1936  1938  1940  Pooled 
Lagged Vote—  
Non-Economic (%) 
.801 
(.052) 
.876 
(.047) 
1.023 
(.033) 
.792 
(.043) 
.871 
(.018) 
Lagged Vote—  
Economic (%) 
.366 
(.210) 
1.227 
(.561) 
1.511 
(.368) 
.768 
(.108) 
.738 
(.102) 
Election-Year  
Income Change (%) 
.033 
(.076) 
.164 
(.070) 
.310 
(.134) 
.550 
(.266) 
.166 
(.046) 
Turnout Change 
(%) 
.053 
(.021) 
.063 
(.016) 
−.017 
(.055) 
.011 
(.029) 
.023 
(.015) 
Intercept  18.32 
(3.81) 
2.36 
(5.14) 
−10.88 
(3.66) 
7.46 
(1.88) 
Election 
fixed effects 
 
Std error of regression  6.19  5.14  5.02  4.67  5.45 
R
2  .63  .78  .84  .84  .79 
N (non-southern 
districts) 
299  304  306  304  1213 
 
 
Democratic Vote, 
Non-South (%) 
54.7  56.3  49.0  50.0  --- 
Election-Year 
Income Effect (%) 
0.6  3.5  −4.3  6.4  --- 
Internalized Economic 
Effect (%) 
5.3  7.2  16.2  9.2  --- 
Residual Democratic 
Support (%) 
48.8  45.5  37.1  34.5  --- 
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Figure 6: Average Produce of Main Crop (Oats) in Ireland
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Figure 7: Average Produce of Second Main Crop (Potatoes) in Ireland
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Figure 8: Saskatchewan Conservative Party Election 
Outcomes
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Figure 9: Alberta Farmer + Labor Parties Election Outcomes
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Figure 10: Alberta Social Credit Party Election Outcomes
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